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Ownership Structures of Electronic B2B 
Marketplaces – A Multi-perspective Analysis 
Stefan Baldi, Hans P. Borgmann 
European Business School, Schloss Reichartshausen 
Abstract: In this paper we develop a framework for the ownership structures of 
electronic markets and contrast different alternatives by using a case study in the 
automotive industry. Focus is General Motors’ decision to join the industry elec-
tronic market place Covisint and Volkswagen’s decision to build an individual 
solution. Building on multiple theories from inter-organizational relationship for-
mation we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of private exchanges vs. 
consortium-based exchanges vs. third party exchanges and illustrate these within 
our case, working towards a comprehensive contingency framework. 
Keywords: Electronic Markets, B2B, Ownership Structure, Automotive Industry, 
Consortia 
1 Introduction 
The emergence of consortium-based electronic markets has recently gained con-
siderable attention. In 2000 a total of 66 newly founded consortia in 18 different 
industries have been counted [WaCh00]. Two of the most prominent examples are 
Covisint – founded by General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler – in the auto-
motive industry and Transora in the consumer goods industry, backed by more 
than 50 leading companies including Nestlé, Kellogg, and Coca-Cola. 
While research has paid considerable attention to electronic markets in general 
(e.g. [Bako98, GrRa99]) it does not explicitly address the corporate structure and 
ownership of electronic markets. In this paper we contrast the consortium-based 
approach to private (single company) and third party exchanges. 
The research is motivated by the current conflicting ideas and uncertainty about 
the best governance structure for electronic markets. For instance, while General 
Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler take a joint consortium approach, Volkswagen 
as well as BMW have started to build private exchange platforms. Taking the 
automotive industry as an example, our aim is to explore the underlying forces 
driving these different governance structures. 
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Our paper starts with a brief introduction to vertical buy-side electronic markets 
and develops a framework for the governance structure of electronic markets. In 
the next part we concentrate on exchange platforms in the automotive industry and 
describe General Motors’s approach with Covisint and Volkswagen’s private so-
lution. Building on multiple theories from inter-organizational relationship 
formation we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the different exchange 
structures and illustrate them with our case. In our conclusion we summarize the 
insights gained from the frameworks and discuss their limitations. 
2 Electronic Markets 
Vertical Buy-side Electronic Markets 
We define an electronic market as an inter-organizational information system that 
fosters market based exchanges between agents in all transaction phases [Bako97]. 
A horizontal market addresses a specific function (e.g. human resources, office 
supplies) and serves a wide range of industries while a vertical market focuses on 
a wide range of functionalities in a specific industry such as chemicals, steel or 
automotive. A buy-side electronic market is focused on procurement, supply chain 
management, and development, while a sell-side market is focused on the demand 
chain, i.e. the processes by which the goods reach the customer [ArGe00]. This 
paper concentrates on vertical buy-side electronic markets. 
While early electronic markets focused on the transaction itself, more and more 
additional services are added to these basic functions. Based on the major value 
chain processes on the buy-side we separate the functionality of electronic markets 
into three areas: 
• E-Procurement refers to all processes concerned with the purchasing of goods 
and services over the Internet. Thus, e-procurement takes a commerce or trans-
action perspective. Economies of scale providing liquidity in an electronic 
market are one of the major success factors. 
• Supply Chain Management integrates all activities associated with the flow 
and transformation of goods from the raw materials stage to the end user. It 
highlights the coordination perspective between all members of the value 
chain. 
• E-Development provides software tools to facilitate collaborative product de-
sign of complex components and modules. It highlights the collaboration 
between a company and its suppliers in innovation processes. Speed and pro-
tection of knowledge assets are key issues. 
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The complexity to support these processes by sophisticated tools increases from e-
procurement to e-development. Furthermore the processes are not completely in-
dependent as for example engineering and procurement will need to work together 
toward the best overall combination of low prices and customer demand. 
Ownership Structures of Electronic Markets 
For a classification of the ownership structure of an electronic market we consider 
two dimensions to be of particular importance: 
• The role of the owners: The owner of the market can be an active market 
participant (i.e. buyer or seller) or an independent third party acting as an 
intermediary. This dimension is an external perspective and has significant im-
pact on the goals and therefore the strategy of the owners towards the other 
parties in the market. 
• The competitive relation of the owners: The companies owning and operating 
the market can be direct competitors outside of this venture or work in differ-
ent fields and are therefore not competing. This dimension takes an internal 
perspective and influences the behavior of the market owners towards each 
other. 
This taxonomy results in four different types of ownership structures for electronic 
markets: 
• Private exchanges are owned and operated by a single company or a group of 
non-competing companies. These companies are also active buyers or sellers 
in the market. 
• A third-party exchange is owned by a group of non-competing companies or a 
single company that is not considered to be a trading partner, often a start-up 
company. 
• In consortia-led exchanges the ownership is shared between companies that 
compete outside of this electronic market. They are also active participants in 
the market. 
• We define a meta market as a group of independent market providers who col-
laborate and exchange requests and offers by interconnecting their market 
places to increase liquidity. 
Figure 1 shows the different approaches and gives examples following the respec-
tive governance structure in italics. 
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of electronic market ownership structures 
Because meta markets are still under development and not in broad use we focus 
on the remaining three market forms. 
Electronic Markets in the Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry is one of the largest and most complex in the world and 
many activities concerning electronic markets can be observed. In [BaBo01] we 
provide an overview on electronic market initiatives in the automotive industry. 
Private exchanges (e.g. Volkswagen, BMW) as well as consortium-based ex-
changes (e.g. Covisint, SupplyOn) and third party exchanges (e.g. ChoiceParts) 
have been established. 
3 Covisint 
General Motors (GM) started to use the Internet for procurement activities in 1998 
by running some purchases through the independent horizontal exchange Free-
Markets. In November 1999 GM announced the creation of its own private 
procurement platform called GM TradeXchange. At the same time Ford an-
nounced the formation of Auto-Xchange as a central private electronic market for 
its procurement activities. Both companies started negotiations to consolidate their 
individual exchange initiatives into one industry-wide trading exchange. In Febru-
ary 2000 they announced that rather than pursue separate, private exchange 
initiatives they would join forces to create the consortium-based market Covisint 
and include DaimlerChrysler as a third manufacturer. In April 2000 Nissan and 
Renault stated their intention to join the partnership. 
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The aggregated purchasing volume of the three founders of Covisint is about US$ 
240 billion. The Covisint concept is planned to be the central exchange not only 
for the participating manufacturers but also for all other members of the supply 
chain. If all suppliers use the exchange for their own purchasing a volume of US$ 
500 to US$ 800 billion is calculated. 
Covisint intends to cover all three functional areas of vertical buy-side electronic 
markets identified above, i.e. e-procurement, supply chain management, and e-de-
velopment. Most applications are presently in the design phase. Covisint stresses 
that its applications will not replace existing solutions – such as ERP systems – in 
the participating companies but merely provide a common interface. 
The purchasing volume of the Volkswagen Group (VW) is about US$ 42 billion. 
To better integrate their suppliers Volkswagen built private internet-based solu-
tions. The Volkswagen SupplyNet (www.vw-zulieferer.de) and the Electronic 
Supplier Link (esl.Volkswagen.de) are two examples. The Electronic Supplier 
Link currently connects about 3,000 suppliers and offers a simple internet-based 
data exchange. 
Volkswagen did not join Covisint but announced a strategic partnership with IBM, 
i2, and Ariba to build a private online exchange platform in April 2000. The main 
reasons cited were that Volkswagen focuses on the efficiency of its supply chain 
instead of price reduction [Menz00]. Furthermore it raised some doubts on infor-
mation security as well as regulatory issues [Reink00]. Volkswagen’s exchange 
will not be run as a separate company but within the existing structures. 
4 Alone or Together? – A Multi-perspective Analysis 
Several theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the formation of inter-
organizational relationships (see e.g. [GrSo95, BaHa00]). KUMAR et al. show in 
their analysis of the adoption of inter-organizational information systems, that the 
use of a single theoretical perspective to explain observed phenomena falls short 
of capturing the complexity involved in the formation of relationships [Kumar98]. 
There is often a portfolio of reasons for alliance formation or for staying away 
from an alliance. In particular, following KUMAR et al., we argue that only a com-
bination of technical-economic as well as socio-political perspectives can help to 
understand complex inter-organizational systems. 
Electronic market research has concentrated on the economic aspect in compari-
son to organizational alternatives (e.g. hierarchies, see [Bako98]) so far. As we 
will show, this perspective falls short of explaining the different approaches to 
electronic markets. In the following sections we investigate and combine six major 
theoretical paradigms as identified by [BaHa00] that span from economic to be-
havioral: Transaction cost economics, resource dependence, stakeholder theory, an 
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organizational learning perspective, institutional theory, and a strategic choice po-
sition are used. We apply these theories to the ownership structure of electronic 
markets in general and illustrate the viewpoints with details from the automotive 
industry using the cases of General Motors and Volkswagen. 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics [Will75] offers an economic perspective on organiza-
tional relations. It contrasts organizational alternatives by comparing their 
respective sum of transaction costs (i.e. internal and external coordination costs) 
and production costs. The existence of inter-organizational relationships such as 
consortia expands the “classical” make or buy decision to make, buy or partner. 
For our investigation we break down the total cost to set-up costs, product costs, 
coordination costs and switching costs [NgBr99, p. 354]. 
Set-up Costs: As a consortium-based electronic market sets a standard for com-
munication and coordination between participants that gets wide acceptance in the 
industry due to the support of leading companies it can be expected that the set-up 
costs will be lower than in a private electronic market. Third-party start-ups and 
private markets may have to convince initial members to join when benefits are 
lower. The more partners are on the other hand involved in a consortium the more 
complex it will be to adopt to their existing back-end IT systems. Additional inter-
faces will have to be specified and the harmonization of processes can be expected 
to be a long and tedious procedure. 
In the automotive industry first tier suppliers are more or less forced to work with 
all manufacturers and traditionally have adapted to their technological require-
ments. Thus each of the big manufacturers will be able to impose its standards on 
the suppliers and set-up costs will not make a big difference from their perspec-
tive. But for Covisint it will be difficult e.g. to integrate all the different CAD 
systems in use as well as the back-end ERP systems. Volkswagen can tailor and 
optimize its market to its own systems. 
Production Costs: A consideration of production costs shows that the process 
costs in a private solution will probably be lower due to an easier and better tech-
nical integration into the internal IT systems of the buyer. Another production cost 
related question is the price of the acquired products and services. A consortium-
based e-marketplace can start with liquidity introduced by its owners. The buying 
power of the consortium-partners can help to receive volume rebates in procure-
ment. 
It has been shown that the expected relative savings in the automotive value chain 
in the US and in Europe are very similar [BaBo01] and thus do not explain the dif-
ferent approaches of Volkswagen and GM. Due to regulatory issues consortia of 
automotive manufacturers will not be allowed to pool their demand for direct pro-
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duction parts. This will only be possible for indirect maintenance, repair, and 
operations (MRO) materials. It can however be expected that Volkswagen will be 
able to achieve similar savings either through other horizontal markets or by in-
viting participants from outside the industry to join. 
Coordination Costs: In an industry with fragmented sellers and buyers a consor-
tium is not very likely due to the increased coordination efforts. It can be expected 
that third parties will aggregate demand and supply on their platforms. Consorti-
ums are likely to emerge only if a limited number of buyers or sellers with 
significant market power exist. But private marketplaces can also materialize 
given that the owner has a strong market position. In a situation with a highly con-
centrated buy and sell side the efforts of building a marketplace will probably not 
pay off and direct relations will be established. 
The automotive industry is characterized by a small number of large automotive 
manufacturers each having a massive buying power. Thus a consortium as well as 
a private approach to electronic markets seems possible from this perspective. 
Switching Costs: If the consortium welcomes additional members it can be con-
sidered to be less expensive to change from a private exchange to a consortium 
than vice versa. The new member can buy into the established platform and start 
using the established services immediately. It can be assumed to be harder for 
consortium-members to abandon the membership and to build an in-house solu-
tion from scratch. 
With its proprietary solution Volkswagen retains the option to switch. If their 
marketplace model fails, it might be easier for Volkswagen to stop the project than 
for competitors that own stakes in Covisint. If one of the exchanges succeeds, 
Volkswagen will either expand its own platform or join Covisint. Given Covisint’s 
open standards and its commitment to attract the largest number of participants 
possible, switching is not likely to put Volkswagen in a serious competitive disad-
vantage. 
Summarizing, the transaction cost perspective does not clearly favor a specific 
ownership structure. Although our case analysis did not show any significant dif-
ferences in the environment as well as in the motivations of GM and VW they 
nevertheless chose different alternatives. For that reason an investigation of addi-
tional theoretical perspectives is needed. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence view [PfSa78] argues that firms partner to get access to 
critical resources and thereby decrease dependence on other organizations. From 
another perspective companies could also engage in partnerships to increase the 
dependence of other organizations on them. 
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The pooling of resources can be a reason to form an alliance for an electronic 
market. Primarily partnerships with technology providers can be explained with 
this argument. They assure access to up-to-date technology and have a positive 
influence on future product developments. The pooling of complementary skills 
can help to build the market faster and to capture first-mover advantages. The re-
source dependence framework can also explain the partnering with otherwise 
competing market participants if the combined efforts can produce a product or 
service that is unique and only imperfectly imitable [Barn91]. The partners could 
set up a market with huge buying power and exclusive services to its members and 
exclude others from the cooperation. 
It can be safely assumed, that in the automotive industry the knowledge of build-
ing and running an electronic market platform is relatively limited for all the 
manufacturers. They can try to pool their domain expertise but even here the 
knowledge within the different companies is very similar. The dependency be-
tween the different levels of the supply chain is traditionally very high in the 
automotive industry. Following a consortium-based approach introduces a new 
dependency between the participating manufacturers. 
Covisint explicitly invites all industry participants to join the initiative. Its goal 
therefore is not to produce a non-imitable and rare service but to foster an indus-
try-wide standard for cooperation. While the addition of Renault and Nissan to 
Covisint can be explained to gain better access to the local European and Asian 
markets, the cooperation between GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler can not be ex-
plained using this framework. 
For Volkswagen the risk of becoming dependent on Covisint partners paired with 
the partial loss of decision autonomy outweighs possible advantages. This per-
spective is closely linked to the question of a trustworthy relationship required for 
a close cooperation. Typically, mutual trust is established slowly, originating in 
minor interactions requiring little risk then progressing to major commitments 
[JiRo99]. Nevertheless VW signaled the willingness to cooperate on standardiza-
tion issues. 
Covisint can also be seen as a vehicle for collective lobbying [Oliv90] to increase 
power and pressure on suppliers to adopt policies favorable to the founders. By 
aggregating more than 50% of the buying power in the industry the Covisint ex-
change is just too big to be ignored by suppliers. Also suppliers sign up more 
quickly because there is not too much confusion as to which exchange might win. 
While Volkswagen supports the idea of an industry-wide standard [Reut00] it 
faces the danger of being left behind in the development of an industry-wide plat-
form. 
Finally Covisint’s founders may have formed the alliance simply because each of 
them perceived it did not have the necessary resources to gain control of new 
Internet B2B channels before anyone else does. In the case of GM the formation 
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of Covisint can be seen as a pre-emptive strike against start-up companies, espe-
cially its former partner FreeMarkets. 
As a result the resource dependence view suggests that companies have to weigh 
the benefits of pooling complementary expertise against the possible dangers of 
becoming dependent on competitors who are partners in a consortium. This is also 
true for a possible dependence on a third party player. 
Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory [Free94] states that organizations form to align their own 
interests with the interests of their stakeholders such as suppliers, shareholders, 
employees, and customers. 
The main stakeholders of an electronic market – besides shareholders and em-
ployees – are the buyers, sellers, and the technology providers. Since a market can 
only work with buyers and sellers present, the fair consideration of both interest 
groups is essential. From a third-party exchange perspective this is an argument to 
invite sellers and buyers to take a stake in the company. If the owner of the mar-
ketplace is also a market participant (buyer or seller) the complementing 
stakeholders could be invited to join to align interests. In many market places 
technology providers are bound financially to the success of the exchange in order 
to increase their commitment. 
In the case of the automotive exchanges this would mean to invite sellers, i.e. sup-
pliers to join the alliance. The founding manufacturers own Covisint and only a 
small minority stake was given to the two major technology providers. It is not 
planned to extend this to suppliers. Nonetheless it is officially stated that one of 
the reasons to form Covisint was the request of suppliers to reduce the number of 
interfaces in the industry. Nevertheless many suppliers are skeptical of win-win 
promises by the alliance of carmakers. They fear that the exchanges will cut into 
profit margins or turn their products into commodities. As a reaction several 
European suppliers have founded their own marketplace (SupplyOn, 
www.supplyon.com) and a group of leading American suppliers is also consider-
ing starting their own venture [Litt00]. 
The addition of other manufacturers to the consortium can only be explained by 
taking a holistic view at the industry and focusing on Covisint’s stated goal to 
transform the whole automotive industry. The Volkswagen initiative is completely 
integrated into its other operations. The technology partners receive no equity 
stake and no other revenue sharing mechanisms are implemented. Not joining 
Covisint and highlighting the supply chain integration issues may also be ex-
plained by Volkswagen’s still damaged image with the suppliers that originates 
from the “Lopez-era” that was characterized by high price pressure and is seen as 
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a mistake within VW today [Henk00]. Volkswagen still has to rebuild trust with 
its suppliers and a participation in Covisint can be seen as contra productive. 
Focusing on shareholder value General Motors realized that the value it brought to 
the independent company FreeMarkets by increasing its stock value outweighed 
the value FreeMarkets brought to GM. According to analysts’ opinions an initial 
public offering of Covisint could eventually have a market capitalization of US 
$30 billion to US$ 40 billion [Menz00]. 
Summarizing the stakeholder perspective, a consortium that is floated as an inde-
pendent company can be in the interest of shareholder value. This potential benefit 
has to be weighed against the possible negative reactions of excluded stakeholders 
as for example suppliers. In our case study Volkswagen seems to put more weight 
on supplier cooperation and less on the potential financial valuation of a powerful 
consortium while GM puts shareholder value in the center of its decision. 
Organizational Learning 
Organizational learning [Dodg93] is concerned with all processes that lead to new 
knowledge in the organization, assimilate it, and apply it to a business setting. 
With respect to inter-organizational relationships a company can absorb knowl-
edge from partners and increase its organizational competencies. 
This theory can be used as an explanation for the collaboration between start-up, 
technology, and consulting companies with established old-economy firms to es-
tablish electronic markets. 
Covisint is part of GM’s e-GM initiative. This initiative has a clear mission to 
bundle e-business activities within GM and also to apply its results to the rest of 
the company. But this does not explain why Covisint had to be founded as a con-
sortium with other manufacturers. It can be safely assumed that the knowledge 
about e-markets within the big car manufacturers is fairly equally distributed. So a 
knowledge transfer cannot be expected from the collaboration. To the contrary the 
newly created knowledge resides primarily in the new organization and it may be 
difficult to get it back into the own company, as the knowledge is then either 
bound to teams that cooperate with a number of major OEMs (implicit knowl-
edge) or owned by outsourcing-partners. 
By developing its own exchange, Volkswagen guarantees that the acquired 
knowledge stays within the company. Another perspective is that VW acquires a 
learning option: Because the automaker’s own staff accumulates knowledge in 
managing electronic trading platforms, Volkswagen maintains flexibility. If simi-
lar platforms are considered suitable e.g. for internal logistics at a later stage, 
Volkswagen will be able to initiate projects on the basis of past experiences with 
the technology. 
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While learning theories concentrate on skill development the danger of losing con-
fidential information should also not be neglected. This is especially true for 
information on products, prices, inventory and orders, as well as for e-develop-
ment. Covisint expects that a sophisticated security system will solve this issue.  
Taking the organizational learning perspective the learning opportunities in a joint 
venture have to be weighed against the possible lock-in of intellectual capital in 
the consortium and the danger of losing confidential information. While VW 
stresses potential dangers GM seems to concentrate on opportunities and is relying 
on technological solutions. 
Institutional Theory 
The basic assumption of institutional theory [DiPo83] is that firms organize to ap-
pear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms even if there are no 
technical of economical advantages. 
In the electronic market domain this could mean that several companies form an 
electronic market or a company joins an existing market because “everybody has 
to do this Internet thing” and the visibility of the company is increased through 
participation. Another aspect is that often system integrators and investment banks 
bring together the participants of a consortium. In a later stage they are billing for 
consulting and financial arrangements and have an interest that these ventures 
carry on until an initial public offering (IPO). 
Some of the early statements about the buying power collected in Covisint and the 
possible valuation after an IPO point in this direction. At the time of Covisint’s 
announcement the B2B wave was on its heights and many old economy compa-
nies tried to be perceived as part of the new Internet economy. Volkswagen takes 
a more conservative approach as it sees the new technology primarily as strategic 
enabler and not as financial investment. 
Summarizing, the institutional theory suggests that the move to join a consortium 
may be shortsighted unless backed by more substantial arguments than current 
movements. The different perspectives of VW and GM mirror a more conserva-
tive approach to financial markets vs. a clear focus on capital markets. 
Strategic Choice 
The strategic choice argument states that firms pursue alliances to increase com-
petitiveness and market power [Barn91]. In general this means that, in the case of 
a consortium, all members should profit, at least in comparison to non-consortium 
members. 
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So while Volkswagen can gain a competitive advantage over others by imple-
menting its own systems, the members of Covisint will have to concentrate their 
efforts on non-Covisint activities. This refers to the general question whether in-
formation technology by itself can help firms to gain competitive advantage or 
whether it is considered to be an imitable and substitutable resource and only IT 
management skills are considered a source of competitive advantage [MaFu95]. 
5 Conclusion 
The theories we used to investigate the question of organizational structures for 
electronic markets fall along a conceptual continuum from economic (transaction 
cost economy) to behavioral (institutional theory) and also include strategic con-
siderations. As shown in our analysis none of the theories clearly suggests one or 
the other organizational structure, but each of them contributes to our overall un-
derstanding of the partnering processes for electronic markets. 
The analysis presented throughout this paper can be summarized along three main 
dimensions: 
• Cost Perspective: Transaction costs provide a economic perspective looking at 
set-up costs, production costs, coordination costs, and switching costs. Com-
plex and specific products and processes require shifting the focus from 
product price to coordination aspects like supply chain management and e-de-
velopment. These suggest an individual private market instead of a consortium 
approach. 
• Capabilities Perspective: In contrast to the transaction cost approach, which 
emphasizes cost minimization, the resource dependence rationale emphasizes 
value maximization through the use of internal and external resources. This 
view is closely related to the organizational learning perspective, which recog-
nizes that resources can also be build up internally over time. The company 
has to weigh its own capabilities against externally available ones. Strong in-
ternal competencies relative to the market suggest a private exchange while 
weak capabilities suggest using an independent third party. The consortium 
can be used if the technology is generally not well understood. 
• Competitive Advantage Perspective: The remaining three theories (institutional 
theory, stakeholder theory, strategic choice) relate to the competitive advan-
tage of a company. Based on the strategic choice theory in the early stages of 
e-markets the highest competitive advantage can be achieved by building a 
private market and the lowest by joining a consortium. This may be different if 
e-markets become a commodity in the future. The stakeholder theory gives the 
option to directly focus on shareholders and financial markets with a consor-
tium IPO or to focus on business partners and long-term success with a private 
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solution. The institutional theory puts organizational behavior in the cultural 
context and is useful to reflect on decisions as well as to explain organizational 
behavior. 
It has to be stressed that participating in a consortium-based exchange or using a 
proprietary market is not an either-or decision. VW as well as Covisint claim to be 
open to possible future collaborations. In fact suppliers in the automotive industry 
plan to join Covisint for their sell-side and forge other activities for their own buy-
side. In general the Covisint example shows that consortium-based exchanges will 
face problems unless both buyer and seller see value in joining the exchange. 
Buyer-managed exchanges will have to offer an open dialogue (and equity) to the 
suppliers in order to align interests. 
Concluding this implies that the advantages and disadvantages to participate in a 
consortium must be carefully weighed, taking multiple perspectives into account. 
In this paper we have developed a taxonomy of governance models for electronic 
markets, applied it to the automotive industry and finally structured the reasons for 
consortium-based and proprietary exchanges. This is the first step to a more com-
prehensive contingency framework. 
Supplementary research is needed to extend these results to sell-side markets and 
markets in other industries. Another question to be examined is whether electronic 
markets exhibit a life cycle, e.g. from third-party through consortium-based to 
proprietary, or whether different market governance structures will exist in paral-
lel. 
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